In the summer of 1956, British, French,
and Israeli leaders deemed the conduct of Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser as provocative. The European
powers were humiliated by his nationalization of their
shares in the Universal Suez Canal Company. They were
concerned about Nasser’s increasing contacts with the Soviet
bloc, his founding role in the nonaligned movement,
and his opposition to European influence in the Arab
world, especially to French colonial rule in Algeria. Israel,
agitated over continuous cross-border infiltration from
Egypt and the blockade of maritime routes in the Red
Sea and the Suez Canal, found more cause for worry in
Egypt’s forthcoming arms supplies from the Soviet bloc.
Thus, Britain, France, and Israel joined forces in a surprise
attack on Egypt, triggering the Suez Crisis on 29
October 1956.
On that day, Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula and
the Gaza Strip. Two days later the British and the French
bombed major Egyptian cities, then conquered the Suez
Canal area in early November.
The Americans and the Soviets collaborated to denounce
and reverse what they viewed as a gross violation
of Egyptian sovereignty by colonial powers. Using their
military, economic, and political supremacy, they forced
a cease-fire, then a full withdrawal of British, French, and
Israeli troops. The United States gave assurances to Israel
that it would enjoy safe passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and
UNpeacekeepers were deployed as a buffer between Egypt
and Israel.
The United States also was concerned about Soviet
encroachments in the Arab world. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower was personally incensed with the timing of
the crisis, which occurred in the final days of his reelection
campaign and during a crisis in Hungary, where
the Soviets were crushing a regime that wanted to leave
the Warsaw Pact. He felt betrayed by Britain and France
and viewed the assault as a challenge to his authority, but
he also wanted to preserveWestern influence.
The proximity of interests between the United States
and Egypt was temporary given Nasser’s aspirations to
lead the Arabs and to display “positive neutrality” in the
Cold War. Already, on 5 January 1957, the Eisenhower
Doctrine, approved by the U.S. Senate two months later,
promised U.S. economic assistance, military support, and
even armed intervention to sustain regimes opposed to
“international communism” in the Middle East. Egypt, a
recipient of Soviet aid, quickly became a U.S. antagonist
over influence in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan.
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